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INTRODUCTION 
Last year the New Zealand singer Lorde cancelled a concert in Tel Aviv following an open letter by 
two New Zealand-based activists urging her to take a stand on Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine. 
A few weeks later, the two activists – Justine Sachs and Nadia Abu-Shanab – found themselves the 
subject of a civil claim before the Israeli court. The claim was brought by the Israeli law group Shurat 
HaDin, on behalf of three minors who had bought tickets to the concert, pursuant to Israel’s so-
called Anti-Boycott Law (the Law for the Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott: 
translation available at <https://law.acri.org.il>). The Anti-Boycott Law provides that a person who 
makes a public call to boycott Israel commits a civil wrong and may be sued for damages (s 1). 
According to newspaper reports, Shurat HaDin claimed that the defendants’ call for boycott harmed 
the teenagers’ “artistic welfare” (Eleanor Ainge Roy “Israel fines New Zealand women $18,000 for 
urging Lorde concert boycott” The Guardian (online ed, 12 October 2018)). The defendants 
apparently did not respond to the suit.  
The Magistrates Court in Israel has now released a judgment upholding the claim and ordering the 
activists to pay about NZ$18,000 in damages (plus costs). Counsel for Shurat HaDin has announced 
that they “will enforce this ruling in New Zealand, and go after [the defendants’] bank accounts until 
it has been fully realized” (Henry Cooke “Israeli court fines two Kiwis $19k for open letter to Lorde 
which led to concert cancellation” (12 October 2018) Stuff <www.stuff.co.nz>). The judgment has 
attracted world-wide attention.  But the defendants, Sachs and Abu-Shanab, are adamant that they 
will not pay up, saying that “Israel has no right to police the political opinions of people across the 
world”, and that the claim “is a stunt of which the sole intention is to intimidate Israel’s critics” 
(Justine Sachs and Nadia Abu-Shanab “Justine Sachs and Nadia Abu-Shanab respond to the Israeli 
court ruling on their open letter to Lorde” (12 October 2018) The Spinoff <www.thespinoff.co.nz>).  
In this note, I want to offer some thoughts on the conflict of laws issues raised by the Israeli 
judgment. In particular, the note addresses – from a perspective of the New Zealand conflict of laws 
– the concern that the judgment represents some kind of jurisdictional overreach, before discussing 
the enforceability of the judgment in New Zealand and elsewhere.  
JURISDICTION OF THE ISRAELI COURT TO DETERMINE CLAIM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISRAELI LAW 
New Zealanders were quick to criticise the Israeli judgment as an illegitimate arrogation of power to 
police political opinions worldwide. Professor Gillespie from Waikato University, for example, 
described the judgment as “political theatre”, designed to cause fear that “if you’re critical of Israel, 
no matter where you are in the world, you could be sued” (“NZ activist being sued in Israel calls it 
‘publicity stunt’” (13 October 2018) Radio New Zealand <www.radionz.co.nz>). The Free Speech 
Coalition tweeted that “[i]t is important that overseas threats of prosecution don’t lead to a chilling 
effect on speech within New Zealand” and that “the New Zealand campaigners should disregard this 
attempt at political censorship”. And Sam Bookman, in The Spinoff, wrote that it was “bizarre that 
two kiwis have become the first successful application of a law that was designed to silence critics 
and satisfy the needs of an increasingly authoritarian politician” (Sam Bookman “The story behind 
Israel’s ‘boycott law’, and how two Kiwis got caught up in a much gnarlier fight” (14 October) The 
Spinoff <www.thespinoff.co.nz>) . Even the Israel Institute of New Zealand spoke out against the 
judgment (“Israel Institute rejects fine on Kiwi BDS supporters” (12 October 2018) Israel Institute of 
New Zealand <https://israelinstitute.org>).  
A question of private international law 
The first thing to note is that the claim was a civil claim brought by a private party seeking 
compensatory damages. It was not a criminal action brought by the Israeli government seeking to 
impose a fine or penalty, as suggested in some of the reporting on the matter.  This point is worth 
emphasising because it means that, for the Israeli court, the question of whether or not it had 
jurisdiction to grant judgment against the New Zealand-based activists was a question of private 
international law. Notably, the Anti-Boycott Law is silent as to its cross-border scope (although the 
original draft Bill expressly contemplated its application to various groups of defendants, including 
foreign nationals). So it seems that Israel’s Parliament has left this question to the local courts to 
resolve in accordance with general rules and principles of Israeli private international law (see Arie 
Peled “The Israeli Anti-Boycott Law: Should Artists be Worried?” (2014) 32 Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment Law Journal 751 at 769ff).  
I am not an expert in Israeli private international law, and I have not been able to obtain access to 
the decision. So I am not in a position to comment on the validity of the Court’s reasoning as a 
matter of Israeli law (although I wonder whether the result would have been the same if the 
defendants had protested the Court’s jurisdiction or defended the claim).  
What I wish to do instead, in light of the suggestions that the judgment amounts to a jurisdictional 
overreach, is to ask whether Israeli private international law here produced an outcome that 
infringed New Zealand notions of international comity or conflicts justice. In other words, is the 
judgment inconsistent with what New Zealand private international law would consider an 
appropriate or legitimate exercise of cross-border jurisdiction? In answering this question, it is 
helpful to distinguish between the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendants, on the one 
hand, and its application of the Anti-Boycott Law to the defendants’ conduct, on the other.  
Personal jurisdiction 
First, the fact that the Israeli court exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendants is not in itself 
problematic. By comparison, New Zealand courts readily assume personal jurisdiction over foreign-
based defendants, provided there is a sufficient connection between the claim and New Zealand (rr 
6.27 and 6.28, High Court Rules). If the defendant is outside of New Zealand at the time of service of 
the claim, the court will exercise restraint in assuming jurisdiction over the defendant (Wing Hung 
Printing Co v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2010] NZCA 502, [2011] 1 NZLR 754 (CA) at [27]-[30]). But the 
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign defendants is no longer considered exorbitant as a matter of 
principle (Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460 (HL) at 481; Abela v Baadarani [2013] 
UKSC 44, [2013] 1 WLR 2043 at [53] per Lord Sumption). The greater the connection of the action to 
New Zealand, the more appropriate it is for the court to assume jurisdiction.  
The claim in this case alleged harm to Israeli individuals, as a result of the defendants’ plea that 
Lorde cancel her concert in Israel. The High Court Rules provide for service out of the jurisdiction 
where a claim is made in tort and the damage was sustained in New Zealand (r 6.27(2)(a)(ii)); where 
the claim arises under an enactment and “any loss or damage to which the claim relates was 
sustained in New Zealand” (r 6.27(2)(j)(ii)); or else where “the claim has a real and substantial 
connection with New Zealand” (r 6.28(5)(a)). At least one of these heads of jurisdiction would have 
been available to the claimant in this case; and it is also at least arguable that Israel was the 
appropriate forum to hear the claim (see rr 6.29(1)(a)(ii) and 6.28(5)(c)). Hence, from a New Zealand 
perspective, it would be difficult to characterise the extent of the Israeli court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction as exorbitant.  
Application of Israeli law 
The second issue, however, is not as clear-cut. Did the application of the Anti-Boycott Law to the 
defendants’ conduct go against New Zealand notions of comity or conflicts justice? A good starting 
point for this inquiry may be to look to public international law, and to ask whether Israel exceeded 
its prescriptive jurisdiction in applying domestic law (ie the Anti-Boycott Law) to foreign facts (ie the 
conduct of the New Zealand-based activists).  But public international law merely defines the very 
outer limits of Israel’s prescriptive jurisdiction. It is private international law that helps us determine 
the proper reach of domestic law, using principles of subject-matter jurisdiction and choice of law. Is 
it unusual then, by reference to such principles commonly applicable in New Zealand (and 
elsewhere), that Israeli private international law would have led to the Anti-Boycott Law being 
applicable in this case?  
At first sight, the answer may appear to be ‘no’. According to Israeli substantive law, claims under 
the Law are treated as civil wrongs (ie torts). If the same characterisation was applied for the 
purposes of private international law, a court might simply apply ordinary choice of law rules 
governing torts (see Peled “The Israeli Anti-Boycott Law” at 768-772; Avneri v Knesset HCJ 5239/11 
(15 April 2015) per Danziger J at [35]). The content of these rules differs from country to country, 
although the most common connecting factors are the locus delicti and the locus damni. New 
Zealand law calls for the law of the country “in which the most significant element or elements of 
[the events constituting the tort] occurred” (Private International Law (Choice of Law in Tort) Act 
2017, s 8(2)(c)). Based on such choice of law rules, it would at least be arguable that Israeli law was 
the law applicable to the alleged wrong, given that the relevant harm here occurred in Israel. Thus, if 
the matter was characterised as tortious, it is difficult to see how New Zealanders could feel put out 
by the Israeli court’s application of Israeli law to the activities of New Zealand-based defendants. 
But it is doubtful that claims under the Anti-Boycott Law should be characterised as tortious for the 
purposes of private international law. Common law principles of characterisation require the court 
to consider the function of the substantive law in question, and to look beyond domestic forms or 
categorisations (see L Collins (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2014) at para 2-039). The purpose of the process of characterisation is to identify the law 
that can most appropriately govern the issue, in light of the foreign connections of the claim (see 
Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599 at [36]).  
The key function of the Anti-Boycott Law is to proscribe conduct calling for the boycott of Israel. The 
result of this is that claims under the Law differ from ordinary civil wrongs, such as the general 
economic torts, in several ways. First, claims under the Law are intrinsically linked to Israel. They are 
concerned with economic, cultural and academic damage caused by a boycott of Israel – they are 
not concerned with damage caused by a boycott of countries other than Israel. Forum laws that are 
specifically dedicated to the protection of domestic interests are not ordinarily suited to 
multilateralism (ie the application of a multilateral choice of law rule such as the lex loci delicti rule). 
This means that, unlike with ordinary torts, their scope is determined unilaterally.  
Second, claims under the Anti-Boycott Law seek to impose liability for the expression of political 
opinion. Imposition of liability in these circumstances amounts to a significant interference with a 
defendant’s basic freedoms, and goes beyond the kind of interference ordinarily associated with civil 
wrongs (compare, for example, the torts of defamation or inducing breach of contract). The 
actionable harm, too, appears to be of a highly political nature. It is not concerned with economic 
loss or emotional harm or reputational damage, at least not in the way that these concepts are 
ordinarily understood in the law of tort. Rather, the heart of the complaint seemed to be that the 
teenagers missed out on a concert by Lorde, and that they suffered “damage to their good name as 
Israelis and Jews”, because the defendants asked her to boycott Israel (Eleanor Ainge Roy “Israel 
fines…”, above). These features are relevant to the question of what New Zealand private 
international law would consider to be an appropriate unilateral delimitation of a statute like the 
Anti-Boycott Law.   
This is not an easy question (not least because it involves an unlikely hypothetical scenario of New 
Zealand facing calls for political boycott). A useful starting point is that countries ordinarily avoid 
giving universal effect to their domestic laws: domestic laws do not apply to the entire world. So it 
would be necessary to impose some limitations on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction when 
applying the Anti-Boycott Law. That is because it would be contrary to the interests of foreign states 
and parties to apply domestic law to conduct that lacks sufficient connection to the forum, in order 
to uphold distinctly domestic policies. The more forum-centred the policy, and the greater the 
interference with the defendant’s freedoms, the closer should be the connection to the forum 
before its law can be applied. (Compare, for example, the critical response to the broad application 
of US competition law by US courts on the basis of the so-called “effects doctrine”: see Chris Noonan 
“The Extraterritorial Application of New Zealand Competition Law” (2007) 22 NZULR 369.) 
In my view, from a perspective of the New Zealand conflict of laws, application of the Anti-Boycott 
Law to the New Zealand activists raises legitimate concerns. The defendants’ call for boycott 
appeared in The Spinoff, a New Zealand publication. It was targeted at Lorde, a New Zealand singer. 
The Law amounts to a significant interference with freedom of expression, for the purpose of 
protecting Israelis’ interests in maintaining their country’s reputation. In other words, it gives effect 
to sensitive and controversial public policies. Foreign defendants would feel legitimately surprised at 
finding themselves subject to these policies; and their application would interfere with the interests 
of foreign states to regulate expression of political thought within their jurisdiction (cf the UK’s 
retention of the double actionability rule for defamation claims in order to protect freedom of 
expression: Private International Law (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1995, s 13).  
Presumably the justification for extending liability to the New Zealand activists was that the harm 
was suffered in Israel. Another relevant consideration is that the Anti-Boycott Law would be much 
less effective if it excludes international boycott (see Avneri v Knesset HCJ 5239/11 (15 April 2015) 
per Danziger J at [35]: I am grateful to Sam Bookman for drawing my attention to this passage). But 
when measured against New Zealand principles of subject-matter jurisdiction, these factors should 
not have been sufficient to lead to the application of the Law. The original draft Bill appeared to limit 
civil liability to Israeli citizens and residents (see Peled “The Israeli Anti-Boycott Law”767). This – or, 
perhaps, the defendant’s residence and presence in Israel at the time of the call for boycott – would 
have been a more appropriate connecting factor.  
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ISRAELI JUDGMENT IN NEW ZEALAND  
Counsel for Shurat HaDin apparently intends to enforce the Israeli judgment in New Zealand, 
pointing to reciprocal arrangements between New Zealand and Israel for the enforcement of foreign 
judgments (Henry Cooke “Israeli court fines…”, above). To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
such arrangement in place between the two states, which means that Shurat HaDin will have to rely 
on New Zealand’s common law rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments. These rules require 
Shurat HaDin to bring separate proceedings against the activists in New Zealand seeking 
enforcement of the Israeli judgment. In other words, the Israeli judgment has no direct effect in New 
Zealand.  
A claim for enforcement will only succeed if it satisfies New Zealand rules on the enforcement of 
foreign judgments. These rules require that the Israeli court must have had personal jurisdiction over 
the defendants. Crucially, whether or not the Israeli court had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants must be determined in accordance with New Zealand – not Israeli – rules of jurisdiction 
(Von Wyl v Engeler [1998] 3 NZLR 416 (CA)). However, New Zealand rules of personal jurisdiction 
apply much stricter standards when determining the jurisdiction of foreign courts (as opposed to the 
jurisdiction of the New Zealand court). They require that the defendants were present in the foreign 
country (ie Israel) at the time of being served with the original (ie Israeli) proceedings, or that they 
submitted to the foreign (ie Israeli) court’s jurisdiction by taking a step in the proceeding (Von Wyl). 
It is not sufficient, as it would have been for the purposes of a claim in the New Zealand court, that 
the claim had a real and substantial connection with Israel (see above).  
I am not familiar with the background to the case, but it appears that neither of these requirements 
– presence or submission – is satisfied here. In short, based on New Zealand law, the Israeli court 
probably lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants, with the result that the judgment will not 
be enforceable here.  
Even if the Israeli court was found to have had personal jurisdiction over the defendants (for 
example, because the defendants somehow submitted to the Israeli court’s jurisdiction), there is a 
good argument that the defendants would have a defence to enforcement on the basis that the 
Israeli judgment is contrary to public policy.  
It is true that the defence of public policy imposes a high threshold. According to the Court of Appeal, 
enforcement would have to “shock the conscience” of a reasonable New Zealander, or “be contrary 
to New Zealand’s view of basic morality or a violation of essential principles of justice or moral 
interests in New Zealand” (Reeves v One World Challenge [2006] 2 NZLR 184 (CA) at [67], [104]). In 
Basing v Brown [2016] NZCA 525, [2017] 2 NZLR 93, the Court of Appeal seemed to require a breach 
of an “absolute” value, holding that application of Hong Kong law to determine the enforceability of 
a mandatory retirement age was not contrary to public policy – even though, based on the Human 
Rights Act 1883 (NZ), forced retirement would have breached the plaintiffs’ right to be free from age 
discrimination (the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court on different grounds). 
But, as I have argued before, New Zealand courts should take account of relevant connections to 
New Zealand when determining whether the defence of public policy can be invoked (Maria Hook 
and Jack Wass “The Employment Relations Act and its effect on contracts governed by foreign law” 
[2017] New Zealand Law Journal 80). Here, the judgment implicated conduct by New Zealand-based 
activists that was closely connected to New Zealand, in the form of the publication of an open letter 
by The Spinoff. The target of the letter, too, was a New Zealander. Based on New Zealand standards, 
publication of the letter amounted to an exercise of the right to freedom of expression. The alleged 
wrong knows no equivalent in New Zealand law and seems to be alien to New Zealand values. In 
these circumstances, the defence of public policy should be available. In fact, it has been argued that 
enforcement of a foreign judgment in such a case could amount to an interference by the New 
Zealand courts with a defendant’s right to freedom of expression, engaging the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act (see William Young J in Reeves at [90]).   
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ISRAELI JUDGMENT IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN NEW ZEALAND 
If the judgment is not enforceable in New Zealand, it is likely that its practical implications for the 
defendants will be limited. Of course, if the defendants were to travel to Israel or acquire assets 
there, Shurat HaDin could take steps to enforce the judgment locally. Counsel for Shurat HaDin has 
also indicated that they may seek to enforce the judgment in a third country (“Israeli court fines two 
Kiwi activists $23,600 over Lorde boycott letter” (12 October 2018) TVNZ News <www.tvnz.co.nz>). 
The chances of enforcement when the defendants travel – or move assets – overseas, depend on 
the particular rules on enforcement applicable in that country.  
It is possible, for example, that US rules for the enforcement of foreign judgments would be easier to 
satisfy than those of New Zealand. In particular, in order to determine whether the Israeli court had 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants, some US courts would ask whether the defendants had 
sufficient “minimum contacts” with Israel. This inquiry is focused on American requirements of due 
process and may prove to be a relatively flexible tool (thus, it may be sufficient that the defendants 
intended to harm the plaintiffs in the forum state: Calder v. Jones, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 
(1984)). A defence of public policy, too, may be more difficult to satisfy, given that US lawmakers are 
currently considering their own anti-boycott legislation: Israel Anti-Boycott Act (HR 1697); but cf § 
4102 US Code, Title 28 (thank you to Jan Jakob Bornheim for drawing my attention to this). But even 
so, if the defendants do not have assets in the United States, and if any travel to the country involves 
only a temporary stay, it would prove challenging for Shurat HaDin to take effective enforcement 
action against the defendants there (or, for that matter, anywhere).  
   
